The Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, part 1, with the Nirañjanī Commentary by Ram-yatna Shukla and Prakāsa Explanatory Notes by K. V. Ramakrishnamacharyulu. Critically edited by K. V. Ramakrishnamacharyulu. South Asian Perspectives, no. 6; Shree Somnath Sanskrit University Shastragrantha Series, no. 2. Pondichery: Institut Français de Pondichéry; Veraval, Gujarat: Shree Somnath Sanskrit University, 2015. Pp. xl + 592. Rs. 1200, €52.

Comparative study of the aesthetic ideas of Ram Chandra Shukla, 1884-1941, Hindi critic, Benedictus de Spinoza, 1632-1677, and Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970, philosophers.

Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I now (...) believe that my cat is sitting on my lap. Similarly, if I now imagine a parade coming down Main Street, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I am now imagining a parade coming down Main Street. And again, if it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky. In each of these aforementioned cases, if circumstances are normal, then, these philosophers say, I have a distinctive kind of privileged epistemic access to facts about my own mental states or events. Of course, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to all facts about my own mental states or events. For instance, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to facts about which unconscious mental states or events I have. But I do have privileged epistemic access to many facts about my own mental states or events, and in particular to the various facts listed above. (shrink)

Contributed articles on Advaita, Hindu philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.

This volume features the complete text of all regular papers, posters, and summaries of symposia presented at the 16th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science ...

Towards Infinity is Ram Chandra’s seminal work on the chakras of the human system and the soul’s journey back to the Source. Its implications are far-reaching – for the first time in thousands of years he sheds new light on human spiritual anatomy by going beyond the seven traditional chakras. The author does not discuss the lower chakras, instead, he starts with the heart and its qualities of love, compassion, courage and empathy as the centre of our humanity. He guides (...) us through the experience of thirteen chakras, from the heart up to the final chakra at the back of the head. He describes the level of consciousness at each chakra and reveals the way to expand our consciousness to embrace each new stage along the way. Towards Infinity is a map of the journey to the ultimate destination, which sincere seekers of spirituality can then experience through their own practice with the support of Yogic Transmission. (shrink)

Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent’s manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing (...) relation consists in the agent’s representing the bases as justifying the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. This article shows that an adequate account of the basing relation requires a particular refinement and combination of these two views. On the hybrid account defended here, the basing relation involves a disposition exercise that is individuated by the agent’s object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying. (shrink)

Although there are various studies comparing Greek and Indian philosophy and religion, and Chinese and Western philosophy and religion, Brahman and Dao: Comparatives Studies in Indian and Chinese Philosophy and Religion is a first of its kind that brings together Indian and Chinese philosophies and religions. Brahman and Dao helps close the gap on a much needed examination on the rich history of Buddhist transmission to China, and the many generations of Indian Buddhist missionaries to China and Chinese Buddhist pilgrims (...) to India, including the legendary Bodhidharma, and Faxian and Xuanzang. (shrink)

Critique of Justice is a collection of reflective essays on ditferent dimensions of justice written by eminent scholars of Philosophy and allied disciplines who are astively engaged in the academic pursuit and promoting the cause of philosophy The book is conceived from the standpoint of multi-perspectival approach to the multifarious concept of justice which is regarded as the highest value in any civilized society On the one hand from traditional metaphysical point of view justice consists of the eternal and immutable (...) principles hat are transcendent, objective and absolute, where as from modern positivistic and empirical approachjustice is ahuman construct relative to time and space. Justice is, therefore, regarded as complex and dynamic concept which is multi-dimensional. It synthesizes other values like rights, liberty equality and property. In this well researched book there are 40 scholarly articles covering a wide range from Plato's concept of justice to Nozick's concept of justice in the Western Philosophy and from Vedic concept of justice to Amartya Sen's view ofjustice in Indian perspective. (shrink)

In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...) interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false. (shrink)

rabbits is a 9x9 bit-grid, in progress. . .

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad offers illuminating new perspectives on contemporary phenomenological theories of body and subjectivity, based on studies of diverse classical Indian texts. He argues for a 'phenomenological ecology' of bodily subjectivity in health, gender, contemplation, and lovemaking.

Der erste Band dieser Reihe trägt den Titel: Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität. Neben einer begrifflichen und inhaltlichen Klärung der Interkulturalität geht es in den Beiträgen um eine grundsätzliche Diskussion und Standortbestimmung der interkulturellen Philosophie in dem heutigen Weltkontext der Philosophie. Der heutige weltphilosophische Kontext bedarf einer komprehensiveren Hermeneutik.

The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority was right to permit tissue typing preimplantation genetic diagnosisOn July 21 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority , Britain’s regulatory agency for reproductive technologies, revised its policy on preimplantation genetic diagnosis for tissue typing.1,2 The authority of the HFEA to enact such a policy was affirmed by the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords, on April 28 2005.3 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis combines in vitro fertilisation with genetic testing. In PGD, embryos generally (...) undergo biopsy prior to the eight cell stage, followed by genetic testing for a particular trait. Tissue typing PGD is done to identify an embryo that is tissue matched for a child suffering from a severe disease requiring bone marrow or cord blood stem cell transplantation and for whom no living donor exists. This procedure was first performed in 2000.4 Precise matching of tissue types is critical to successful tissue transplant, and the donors of such tissues are often referred to as “saviour siblings”.Where a tissue matched individual already exists, extracting bone marrow from that individual or collecting cord blood already in storage, rather than creating a match, presents the most immediate treatment alternative. Bone marrow donation from adults or other medically competent individuals is not generally ethically contested, and bone marrow donation from medically incompetent individuals is also permissible under certain conditions.5 Where no living tissue donor exists, however, intentionally creating a donor through tissue typing PGD is among a short list of possible treatment options.The July HFEA policy change makes PGD licensable in cases where tissue typing is the only purpose of testing. Previously, PGD was licensable in the UK only for disease testing, and tissue typing PGD was permissible only when …. (shrink)

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for (...) S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non-theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons. (shrink)

Liberals claim that some perceptual experiences give us immediate justification for certain perceptual beliefs. Conservatives claim that the justification that perceptual experiences give us for those perceptual beliefs is mediated by our background beliefs. In his recent paper ?Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic?, Nico Silins successfully argues for a non-Moorean version of Liberalism. But Silins's defence of non-Moorean Liberalism leaves us with a puzzle: why is it that a necessary condition for our perceptual experiences to justify (...) us in holding certain perceptual beliefs is that we have some independent justification for disbelieving various sceptical hypotheses? I argue that the best answer to this question involves commitment to Crispin Wright's version of Conservatism. In short, Wright's Conservatism is consistent with Silins's Liberalism, and the latter helps to give us grounds for accepting the former. (shrink)